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Essay
ARE AMERICAN CEOS OVERPAID, AND, IF
SO, WHAT IF ANYTHING SHOULD BE DONE
ABOUT IT?
RICHARD A. POSNER†
INTRODUCTION
The genesis of this article is a lecture on executive
overcompensation that I gave at the University of Pennsylvania in
October 2006, and the article was substantially completed shortly
after I gave another version of the talk in March 2007 at Stanford
University—eighteen months before the beginning of the depression
1
in which (I am convinced) the nation now finds itself. Even back then
the question whether executive compensation in publicly owned
American companies was in some sense excessive was much in the
2
news. But now an affirmative answer is accepted not only by many
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leading scholars but by almost the entire nation, including many chief
executive officers. The curtailment of executive compensation has
been a feature of the bailouts by which the government has sought to
limit the consequences of the economic collapse. At first the
curtailment was ad hoc, but the government has now decided to cap
at $500,000 the annual salary of senior executives of banks or other
financial firms that (from now on—the new policy is not retroactive)
4
receive bailouts from the government.
The crisis largely vindicates my analysis, but it also strengthens it.
The problem of executive compensation is not only real; it is more
serious than I believed it to be, in respects explained in this latest
version of my thinking about the problem. That said, I am not
enthusiastic about the new policy about senior executives of financial
firms that receive bailouts. I believe that to impose such a limitation
at this time, in the midst of a depression, is a distraction that will not
promote recovery from the depression, but on the contrary will retard
it by increasing the uncertainty of the political environment in which
the financial sector finds itself. That uncertainty, which a cap on
compensation can only increase (as well as distracting executives
from their jobs by causing them to adjust their personal finances and
no doubt to seek ways of circumventing the cap), will complicate
efforts by the banking industry to get back on its feet. But that is a
detail, so far as this paper is concerned, which is addressed to the
general problem of executive overcompensation.
Four issues need to be addressed: What does “excessive”
compensation mean? Is the compensation of American CEOs
excessive (or was it, on the eve of the financial crisis that has sent the
compensation of many CEOs plummeting)? If so, what are the
consequences? If there are significant negative consequences, what if
3. See, e.g., LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1–12 (2004). Michael Weisbach
agrees that Bebchuk and Fried have presented “fairly persuasive” evidence that corporate
executives “control their own boards and . . . maximize their own compensation subject to an
‘outrage constraint,’” though he disagrees with their proposals for reform. Michael S. Weisbach,
Optimal Executive Compensation Versus Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and
Jesse Fried’s Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 45
J. ECON. LITERATURE 419, 419, 423–26 (2007).
4. Congress, as part of the stimulus bill signed into law on February 16, 2009, has imposed
even more stringent caps on the compensation of executives of recipients of bailout money. I do
not discuss these.
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anything should be done to prevent them? My analysis is largely a
synthesis of the existing literature; if there is a novelty, it is my
emphasis on methods of overcoming agency costs that are available to
government and charitable agencies but not to business corporations.
My focus on CEOs is mainly in the interest of simplification; most of
the analysis applies to other top-tier corporate managers.
I. AGENCY COSTS AND COMPENSATION
I do not think it would be fruitful to try to define “excessive”
compensation with reference to an ethical concept of a “just” reward,
a concept that might be based for example on notions of an
acceptable ratio between the compensation of the highest-paid and
lowest-paid worker in an organization. In any event, I shall not try to
do so. Rather, I shall define excessive compensation in what seem to
me the correct economic terms: compensation is excessive when it is
greater than it would be if agency costs were zero.
The concept of agency costs thus is basic to my analysis. A
principal hires an agent to do a job that the principal could not do as
well (or as cheaply) himself. The principal wants the agent to strive to
do the best possible job at the lowest possible cost. In other words, he
wants the agent’s incentives to coincide with his own. But the agent is
a self-interested person just like the principal. Unless the principal
can evaluate and monitor the agent’s performance with great
accuracy and adjust the agent’s compensation accordingly, the agent
is unlikely to be perfectly faithful to the principal. He will slack off, or
divert revenues to himself, or both.
A CEO is the agent of a principal that consists of the owners of
the corporation. When ownership is widely dispersed, as in the
modern publicly held corporation, none of the part owners is likely to
have an incentive to expend resources on careful selection and
monitoring of the CEO; the gains will be largely reaped by the part
owners who free ride on the efforts of any part owner who does invest
in selection and monitoring. The modest gain that he reaps from his
efforts will be less than their cost. With positive agency costs (the
costs arising from imperfect agency), CEO compensation is likely to
be excessive in the sense of being greater than it would be if the
incentives of principal and agent were perfectly aligned and agency
costs therefore zero.
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Agency costs are fundamental to understanding the corporation;
they are not merely a clue to the possibility of excessive
compensation of the CEO. It is agency costs, rather than the law of
diminishing returns, that limit the efficient size of firms; diminishing
returns limit merely how much of a single product a firm can produce
efficiently. Because the span of supervision by one person is limited,
the more employees a firm has, the more supervisors it requires; and
the more supervisors it has, the more supervisors of supervisors it
requires because the span of control is limited at every tier of the
hierarchy. So as an organization expands, layers of supervisors
increase, leading to delay in executing orders, loss of information,
attenuation of the directions emanating from the top, and, in short, a
weakening of control and coherence. This weakening makes it harder
to overcome the inefficiency created by the fact that the larger and
more complex an organization, the harder it is to correlate the work
of a particular employee with the value of the organization’s output,
and so the employee’s incentives will fall farther out of alignment
with those of the firm. Employees will have greater scope to engage
in behavior that serves their own interests but not those of the firm.
The multidivisional (decentralized) corporate structure is an effort to
minimize hierarchical layering, but eventually it too becomes so
5
cumbersome that the growth of the firm is brought to a halt.
Since the very purpose of an organization is to coordinate
activity, it is natural to think that an organization must be a more
efficient method of coordination than leaving things to private
ordering—markets, tacit agreements, bargaining, give-and-take,
social networks, customs, and the like. But as Friedrich Hayek
6
famously argued, this commonsensical idea is fallacious.
Knowledge—especially knowledge of how to do something rather
than knowledge of facts or procedures that can be formulated and
7
communicated as a set of directions—is difficult to transfer. As a
result, the manager of a complex system is unlikely to have at his

5. On the costs and benefits of multidivisional corporate structure, see Henry Ogden
Armour & David J. Teece, Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the
Multidivisional Hypothesis, 9 BELL J. ECON. 106, 106–08 (1978).
6. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 passim
(1945); F.A. von Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 33, 47–53 (1937).
7. On the difficulties of intrafirm knowledge transfers, see Gabriel Szulanski, Exploring
Internal Stickiness: Impediments to the Transfer of Best Practice Within the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 27, 27–32 (1996).
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fingertips, or be able readily to obtain, all the information he needs in
order to be able to exercise control intelligently. Hence the
importance of decentralized methods of coordination, such as the
economic market, in which dispersed knowledge—each individual
consumer’s knowledge of his needs and opportunities, each individual
seller’s knowledge of his costs, his suppliers, his customers—is
aggregated by the price system. Price operates as a method by which
private information is diffused throughout a market and ultimately
throughout the entire national and world economy. It impounds and
conveys information economically and authoritatively. But it does not
“work” as the control mechanism within a firm—if it did, one would
not need firms, just individual independent contractors. Within the
firm (or at least within each division of the firm—for transfer pricing
based on market prices is often used to value “sales” by one division,
conceived of as a “profit center,” to another in a vertically integrated
firm), production is guided by supervisors’ directives rather than by
contract and price, and so the question of how to compensate the
workers becomes acute.
The cheaper it is to monitor the worker’s performance, the
cheaper it is substitute direct control over that performance for a
price system in which the worker is paid for his output. But when
tasks are complex, the cost of monitoring can be very great. Efforts to
reduce that cost include inculcating workers (lawyers, accountants,
and engineers, for example) with professional norms, in the hope that
they will be motivated to comply with those norms even when there is
no supervisor looking over their shoulder. Other devices are legally
enforced contracts, tort principles such as fiduciary duty, and of
course civil and criminal laws against fraud. Some organizations try to
create a high-commitment environment, in which workers identify
emotionally with the organization’s goals.
But none of these devices fully solves the agency-cost problems
of the large business corporation. One observes, for example, that
wages usually vary across the employees of the same rank in the same
company by much less than the differences in their contributions to
the company, and that employees who do satisfactory work can
expect real (that is, inflation-adjusted) annual increases in their wages
throughout their career with the firm even though their contribution
will not be increasing that fast and eventually will not be increasing at
all. The first phenomenon—horizontal wage compression—may
reflect the difficulty of measuring individual contributions to team
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production, though despite that difficulty it often is apparent (and to
the other members of the team, as well as to management) that one
member of the team is the best; so he is promoted and given a higher
salary; in this way, at least marked differences in contribution are
9
rewarded. The second phenomenon—call it vertical wage drift—is
intended in part to match income with consumption over the life cycle
10
and in part to solve the “last period” problem. A worker who is
“overpaid” as he nears retirement will not slack off (as he might
otherwise be inclined to do, having not much of a future with the
firm), since if he does and he is fired he will lose his windfall wage.
Nonvested pension rights are a parallel device.
Of all the employees of a corporation, the CEO poses the
greatest challenge to the control issue. His performance is especially
difficult to evaluate because of the uncertainty that surrounds success
11
in business. And his only “supervisor” is the board of directors
because management’s advantages in proxy fights prevent
shareholders from influencing the compensation policies adopted by
12
the board —and the board, as we shall see, is an unreliable agent of
the principal (the shareholders). Even if the literature on
13
performance-based evaluation of corporate executives yielded a
reliable method of evaluating the performance of CEOs of large
corporations, boards of directors would be unlikely to force it on the
CEO.

8. John Bishop, The Recognition and Reward of Employee Performance, 5 J. LAB. ECON.
S36, S37–S41 (1987); see also Harley Frazis & Mark A. Loewenstein, Wage Compression and the
Division of Returns to Productivity Growth: Evidence from EOPP 3 (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Working Paper No. 398, 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/osmr/abstract/
ec/ec060100.htm (“[O]nly 32 percent of differences in starting productivity are reflected in
differences in starting wages, even after accounting for differences in productivity growth.”).
9. See Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion
Dynamics Inside Firms, 24 J. LAB. ECON. 59, 93 (2006).
10. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of
Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence, 100 J. POL. ECON. 468, 486–95 (1992).
11. See Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing with Style: The Effect of
Managers on Firm Policies, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1169, 1170–71 (2003).
12. See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones 18–27 (Yale Law & Econ.
Paper, Research Paper No. 348, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980695.
13. See, e.g., HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON COMPENSATION (Harvard Business Review
ed., 2001); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We
Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them ii, 19–22 (Harvard Bus. Sch.
Negotiation, Orgs. & Mkts. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305.
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It is often assumed that agency costs must be higher in
government agencies and other nonbusiness organizations than in
private, profit-making corporations because the discipline exerted by
competition in product markets and capital markets is missing. We
shall see that those disciplines are overrated as controls on corporate
agency costs. But a neglected point is that governmental and other
noncommercial organizations have tools for limiting agency costs that
14
business firms lack and that are by no means ineffectual. Such
organizations are often able to create the high-commitment culture
15
that I mentioned, in which employees work hard, often (even at the
CEO level) for rather meager pay, because they internalize the goals
of their principal. Wages are also kept down by monopsony when the
government or other noncommercial employer does not face
competition. If you want very much to be a soldier, an intelligence
officer, a forest ranger, a priest, or a judge, you have very limited
employment options. And low pay, paradoxically, can be a screening
device for quality, by eliminating from the applicant pool persons
who are not highly committed to the employer’s mission.
Furthermore, professional schools inculcate professional norms that
operate to guide and constrain the work of lawyers, judges,
accountants, military officers, teachers, and other professionals who
populate noncommercial enterprises, as they do commercial ones—
but the latter are controlled by business executives, and business is
not a profession.
Government agencies compete for appropriations and
sometimes sell in competitive markets, as in the case of governmentowned universities and hospitals; and nonprofit firms, such as
universities and even churches, compete vigorously. So there are
elements of product-market and capital-market competition in the
noncommercial sector. And in the case of federal agencies,
congressional committees provide a system of oversight—often
ineffectual oversight, to be sure, but in that respect no different from
the oversight provided by the average board of directors. A
difference that favors congressional oversight is that congressional

14. I have discussed these in my work on the reform of our national security intelligence
services. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE
REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, at 137–38 (2005).
15. See supra pp. 986–87.
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committees have large professional staffs; boards of directors
generally do not have staff.
My point is not that noncommercial organizations are more
efficient than business firms, though the former certainly are not
plagued by a problem of overcompensation of their CEO equivalents.
Probably they are less efficient, though in part this may be because
increasingly, given the privatization movement, it falls to government
to perform the functions that the commercial sector is unable to
perform satisfactorily; it is a kind of supplier of last resort. My point is
that although there are methods of limiting agency costs that do not
depend on product-market or capital-market competition, they are
largely unavailable to business corporations, so that if product
competition
and
market
competition
do
not
prevent
overcompensation, nothing else is likely to do so.
II. ALIGNING CEO COMPENSATION WITH
SHAREHOLDERS’ INTERESTS
My focus in this Part is on the adequacy of the competitive,
contractual, and institutional devices by which a CEO’s incentives are
sought to be aligned with that of his principal; as throughout this
Article, the focus is on the large, publicly held American corporation.
A. Why Are American CEOs Paid More?
American CEOs are paid on average about twice as much as
16
their counterparts in other countries. This is not because Americans
at all levels earn more than their foreign counterparts; the margin is
much smaller below the CEO level, and sometimes is negative. The
proximate cause of American CEOs’ higher incomes is that, as shown
in the following table, salaries are a much smaller fraction of their
17
compensation than of foreign CEOs’ incomes —less than half—with
16. TOWERS PERRIN, WORLDWIDE TOTAL REMUNERATION 2003–2004, at 20 (2004);
Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market
Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2004).
17. TOWERS PERRIN, WORLDWIDE TOTAL REMUNERATION 2005–2006, at 24 (2006);
TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 16, at 24; see also Trevor Buck, Azura Shahrim & Stefan Winter,
Executive Stock Options in Germany: The Diffusion or Translation of US-Style Corporate
Governance?, 8 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 173, 174 (2004) (comparing the relative importance
of base salary in CEO total compensation in the United States (27 percent) with the United
Kingdom (43 percent) and Germany (52 percent)); Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric
B. Rasmusen, Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax
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the rest consisting partly of bonuses but mainly of stock options. The
difference in the structure of compensation may be due in part to the
fact that foreign firms, inhibited by culture and sometimes by law in
their ability to economize on labor costs, have less power to influence
the profitability and hence market capitalization of their firms. In
addition, power tends to be less concentrated in the CEOs of foreign
firms than of U.S. firms, so again the ability of the former to influence
19
the value of the firm is less. An offsetting factor, however, is that
power is a source of nonpecuniary income, so the greater the power,
the greater the full income of the CEO.
Year

Average CEO
Compensation
($ millions)

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

2.329
2.045
2.151
2.280
3.146
3.829
4.495

Average
Value of
Options
Granted
($ millions)
0.706
0.702
0.872
0.862
1.475
1.942
2.258

Options as
Percentage of
Total
Compensation

Number of
Observations

30%
34%
41%
38%
47%
51%
50%

363
1153
1541
1596
1642
1664
1724

Records 9, 14 (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper
No. 567, 2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/567_
Ramseyer_etal.php; Martin J. Conyon, John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, How High is US CEO
Pay? A Comparison with UK CEO Pay 10–11 (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907469 (reporting that British CEOs received 43 percent of their
total compensation from normal salary, compared with 31 percent for U.S. CEOs). But see
Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Executive Compensation-Setting Practices in France, 33
LONG RANGE PLAN 527, 536 (2000) (reporting that French governments have “actively
promoted” stock options “not only for executives but for all employees, with the underlying
intention of aligning interests between the executives, employees and shareholders”).
18. The source of the data for this table is Wharton Research Data Services, the home page
of which explains:
Executive Compensation database contains over 2500 companies, both active and
inactive. The universe of firms cover the S&P 1500 plus companies that were once
part of the 1500 plus companies removed from the index that are still trading, and
some client requests. Data collection on the S&P 1500 began in 1994. However, there
is data back to 1992 but it is not the entire S&P 1500. It is mostly for the S&P 500.
Wharton Research Data Servs., Overview of Executive Compensation, http://wrds.wharton.
upenn.edu/ (restricted access) (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
19. Thomas, supra note 16, at 1202–09.
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5.224
6.695
6.324
4.909
4.569
5.205
5.472

3.183
4.455
4.111
2.576
1.802
2.059
1.860

61%
67%
65%
52%
39%
40%
34%

[Vol. 58:1013
1799
1782
1655
1657
1679
1675
1638

Stock options have seemed an ingenious device for aligning the
incentives of the owners of the corporation with those of the CEO,
but they also entail more generous compensation because they impart
risk (variance) to the CEO’s income, augmenting the risk inherent in
the fact that much of a CEO’s human capital may be specific to his
firm. Because business executives, as distinct from entrepreneurs, do
not like risk, they will demand a higher wage if the wage has a
substantial risky component; and stock options are risky. This may
explain some of the difference between American and foreign CEO
compensation, but probably not all, or perhaps not any, because job
turnover at the CEO level is greater in Europe than in the United
20
States.
Another possible explanation for the difference between
American and foreign CEO compensation is that stock ownership is
21
more concentrated abroad than in the United States. Individual
shareholders have a greater incentive to monitor the performance of
their firm’s managers the more they have at stake and the larger their
share of the firm’s stock; their relative as well as absolute ownership
is relevant because the higher the percentage of voting stock they
control, the more they can influence management.

20. In 2005, 35 percent of CEO turnover was involuntary in the United States, whereas the
corresponding figure for Europe was 42 percent. Chuck Lucier, Paul Kocourek & Rolf Habbel,
CEO Succession 2005: The Crest of the Wave, STRATEGY & BUS., Summer 2006, at 100, 109,
available at http://www.strategy-business.com/media/file/sb43_06210.pdf.
21. Thomas, supra note 16, at 1186–89. Professor Thomas’s excellent article mounts a
powerful case that the differences in CEO pay between the United States and foreign countries
are due to factors unrelated to overcompensation, including greater job mobility of U.S.
executives and the fact that U.S. CEOs have more authority in their firms than their foreign
counterparts do, as well as differences in risk. But Thomas does not attempt to measure the
effect, singly or in the aggregate, of these factors. For the contrast between corporate ownership
structures in German, Japan, and the United States, see Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1936–41
(1993).
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The more effective shareholder monitoring is, the less need there
is for incentive-based compensation: the stick is substituted for the
carrot. This is a clue that agency costs may indeed lead to
overcompensation in corporations in which ownership is widely
dispersed, for otherwise why should greater stockholder
concentration result in lower CEO compensation?
Yet it might seem that such dispersion should not matter because
the CEO’s compensation is determined by the board of directors,
who are elected by the shareholders. But the board of directors does
not solve the problem of agency costs that arises from the dispersed
ownership of a publicly held corporation. The more dispersed that
ownership, the weaker the incentive of shareholders to base their
vote for the slate of proposed directors on a careful study of the
candidates, especially because only rarely are there competing slates.
Shareholder election of directors resembles the system of voting in
the Soviet Union and other totalitarian nations.
Monitors who are not monitored are imperfect agents of their
principal, and so in the absence of effective monitoring of directors by
the shareholders, boards have weak incentives to limit CEO
compensation. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that a board of
directors is likely to be dominated by highly paid business executives,
22
including CEOs of other companies. They have a conflict of interest,
since they have a financial stake in high corporate salaries, their own
salaries being determined in part by the salaries paid to persons in
comparable positions in other companies. They also have a natural
psychological tendency to believe that the high salaries of corporate
23
executives accurately reflect executives’ intrinsic worth. People are
24
strongly inclined to exaggerate their own merit; many people feel
underpaid; virtually none feels overpaid.
In addition, directors devote only a fraction of their time to the
25
company. And if they are inside directors (that is, full-time

22. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 33. Professors Bebchuk and Fried note
that “in 2002, 41 percent of the directors on compensation committees were active executives,
with about half of them active CEOs. Furthermore, another 26 percent of the members of
compensation committees were . . . retirees [who] were for the most part former executives.”
23. See id.
24. See David Koeppel, Fudging the Facts on a Résumé Is Common, and Also a Big Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 10, at 1; Ted O’Callahan, Study: Almost Half of Résumés Are
Bogus, INC.COM, Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200602/resume.html.
25. THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 123 (1982).
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employees of the firm), they have a palpable conflict of interest, while
if they are outside (independent) directors, they have less access to
information about the company than insiders and a smaller stake in
the corporation’s success. That explains why there is no persuasive
evidence that corporate performance is positively correlated with the
26
percentage of independent directors on the corporation’s board.
Many outside directors have no business experience.
CEOs, moreover, influence the selection of outside as well as
inside directors; and there is evidence of mutual back scratching—the
directors authorizing generous compensation for the CEO and the
27
CEO supporting generous fees for the directors. CEOs hire and pay
the auditors who certify the correctness of the corporation’s financial
statements, dangle consulting contracts in front of auditors who also
offer consulting services, and can influence securities analysts’ reports
by steering underwriting fees to investment banks whose analysts give
their companies glowing reports.
Still another reason to doubt that boards of directors ride herd
on CEO compensation is that they can shield themselves from
criticism, should the firm perform poorly, by pointing out that they
paid top dollar for the CEO. Presumably therefore he was the best
candidate for the post, and so in picking him they made the best
choice they could have made and should not be blamed for his
failures. The generosity of the compensation package they gave him
thus becomes evidence that he was indeed the best choice ex ante.
Conversely, if to economize they paid a second-best candidate less
than they would have had to pay the best, then should he prove a bust
they invite a charge of having been penny wise and pound foolish.
The consulting firms that boards of directors hire to advise them
on selection and compensation of a CEO play to the self-protective
instincts of directors by invariably recommending that the board hire
as CEO someone who will demand compensation in the 75th or
higher percentile of the CEOs of the firms that the consultant has
identified as comparable to the board’s firm. The result is an upward
ratchet in CEO compensation; the old 75th percentile becomes the
new 50th percentile, making the new 75th percentile higher than the

26. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Ivan E. Brick, Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, CEO Compensation, Director
Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403, 421 (2006).
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old one. The compensation consultants have a conflict of interest
because, like many accounting firms, they sell other consulting
29
services to the firm.
In March 2007, a company, The Sharper Image, daringly broke
with the pattern and deliberately hired a “cheaper” candidate than
30
recommended to it, Steven Lightman. He lasted only ten months in
the job, during which time the price of the company’s stock
plummeted; the company is now bankrupt, and its bankruptcy
31
preceded the recent financial crisis. One does not know whether any
other executive would have done better than Lightman, but doubtless
most boards of directors will take The Sharper Image’s experience as
confirming the wisdom of the conventional approach to CEO
compensation.
And almost always the CEO is a member of the board of
directors. The reason is that the board of directors of a corporation,
unlike the board of trustees of a university, has responsibilities that go
far beyond the selection and monitoring of the CEO. (That, along
with fund raising and the management of endowment funds, is the
principal function of a university’s board.) The corporate board
participates in shaping corporate strategy. This makes it complicit in
the CEO’s decisions and reluctant by firing him or cutting his pay to
acknowledge a mistake for which it may be jointly responsible.

28. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 39; Gretchen Morgenson, Peer Pressure:
Inflating Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 3 (Business), at 1.
29. See Joann S. Lublin, Theory and Practice: Conflict Concerns Benefit Independent Pay
Advisers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2007, at B3; Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Finds Conflicts
in Executive Pay Consulting, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at C1.
30. Joann S. Lublin, Seeking New CEO, Some Boards Skip the Stars; Directors Enter
Negotiations with Limits on Pay, Perks; On Tap: Backup Candidates, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2007,
at B1.
31. Joann S. Lublin, Sharper Image Tries to Refocus with New CEO, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26,
2007, at A12; Ruthie Ackerman, Sharper Image Files for Bankruptcy, FORBES.COM, Feb. 20,
2008, http://www.forbes.com/markets/2008/02/20/sharperimage-lillianvernon-retail-markets-equ
ity-cx-ra-0220markets36.html; Robert Conway of Conway, Del Genio, Gries & Co., LLC Named
Chief Executive Officer Replacing Steven Lightman, Jerry W. Levin to Remain Chairman,
REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS155943+14Feb2008+BW20080214; Yahoo! Finance, Sharper Image Corp. Historical Prices,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=SHRPQ.PK&a=02&b=26&c=2007&d=01&e=14&f=2008&g=
m (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
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B. The Effect of Compensating CEOs with Substantial Stock Options
The inference that boards of directors are not policing CEO
compensation adequately is supported by the fact that the most
significant “incentive” component of CEO incomes—stock options—
are not well correlated with a CEO’s contribution to the value of his
32
company. Many things move a company’s stock besides the decisions
of its CEO. To tie his income to the value of his company’s stock is a
bit like tying the salary of the president of the United States to GNP.
The analogy is particularly close in an industry like oil, in which the
profits of an oil company are largely a function of the price of oil,
over which the companies have little control. In addition, tying an
executive’s compensation to the value of the corporation’s stock
creates an incentive to manipulate the stock price, and there is
evidence that this incentive has been responsible for a number of
33
financial debacles. Not that it is a mistake to tie the CEO’s fortunes
to those of the corporation, but that can be done by requiring him to
34
place all his financial assets in stock of the corporation. That would
solve or at least mitigate the conflict of interest between CEO and
shareholders that arises from the fact that he is less diversified and
therefore more risk averse than the shareholders would like him to
be. Of course he would have to be compensated for bearing the
additional risk, but that compensation need not be as generous as it is
when it takes the form of stock options, requiring no investment by
the CEO but instead an arbitrary decision by the board (his board, as
it were) on how many options to issue to him and at what exercise
price.
Indeed, the stock-option method of compensating CEOs has
been found to induce them to take excessive risks because of the
asymmetry of gain and loss: there is no ceiling on the potential gain,

32. See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity
Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, Economic Policy Review, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON.
POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 35; Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock
Options, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 49, 59, 58–61.
33. See Sharon Hannes, Gatekeeper Incentive Compensation 13–21 & nn.44–78
(Northwestern Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-19, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1263563.
34. Core et al., supra note 32, at 38.
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but the loss is truncated at the value of the options. And sometimes
there is no loss, because the options are “repriced,” enabling the
CEO to exercise the option at a profit even though the corporation’s
stock price has fallen below the original exercise price. Through the
repricing of options and other devices, the alignment between the
CEO’s interests and those of the shareholders is broken.
Another questionable compensation practice is giving the CEO
an employment contract entitling him to generous severance pay, so
that if he is fired he is cushioned against loss. This reinforces his
incentive to take excessive risks, and at the same time signals his lack
of self-confidence. The fact that a CEO would ask for a contract,
rather than demanding higher pay to compensate him for forgoing it,
should be a strong negative signal to the board of directors.
Incentivizing the CEO to take risk, while at the same time
cushioning him from the consequences of loss, is a similar kind of
mistake to the mistake that led to the savings and loan crisis of the
1980s. Since deposit insurance was not experience-rated, savings and
loans institutions (S&Ls) could borrow at low rates and, by making
risky loans at high rates, generate high expected returns—but at a
high risk of loss. Similarly, the CEO cushioned against loss has an
incentive to take high risks in order to maximize the expected value
of his stock options.
The choice of stock options as the principal method of providing
nonsalary compensation to CEOs may be related to the fact that the
income generated by these options, unlike salary or bonus income,
36
until recently did not have to be and usually was not, reported as a
corporate expense. (There was also a tax advantage, since above a
certain level compensation to high corporate executives is not
deductible by the corporation as an expense.) This inference is
further supported by the recent revelations that a number of
companies backdated the award of stock options in order to
37
guarantee that the options would be in the money, a practice that
35. See Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The Effects
of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1055,
1063 (2007).
36. SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin Accounting Standards No. 123, § A240 (i)
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf.
37. See, e.g., Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price
Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 294 (2007); Erik Lie, On
the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 803 (2005); Mark Maremont &
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cannot be justified on incentive grounds. In some cases no doubt the
practice was not that of the company itself but that of disloyal
executives—though this would be further evidence that agency costs
interfere with efforts to align managers’ incentives with those of the
firm.
Repricing stock options and backdating options are not identical,
but they are related, the latter being the concealed version of the
former. Like other measures that reduce the riskiness of CEO
compensation, repricing stock options can be defended on the ground
that the riskier the compensation, the higher the competitive wage;
and one way to reduce that riskiness and thus lower the wage is to
reduce the tight coupling of pay to the market value of a company’s
38
39
stock. But the empirical evidence for such decoupling is weak, and
there is a counterargument: In the presence of uncertainty, a principal
cannot evaluate the quality of his agent’s work directly; he can only
infer quality from the firm’s output. So the principal is likely to base
compensation on that output even though the output is risk laden and
so results in his having to pay the agent a premium for bearing risk.
But if generous CEO compensation is intended to motivate CEOs to
take risks on behalf of shareholders whose diversified portfolios make
them less risk averse than the CEO, it seems odd to reduce the
riskiness of the CEO’s compensation by repricing his stock options in
order to reduce his compensation. How can the board have it both
40
ways? I return to this question later.
Of course security analysts, and stockholders having a stake large
enough to follow closely the affairs of a company in which they invest,
can calculate the expense of stock options. But the ordinary public
cannot; and later I discuss evidence that capital markets are not as
efficient at pricing securities at the best estimate of their companies’
discounted present value as economists and finance theorists used to

Charles Forelle, Open Spigot: Bosses’ Pay: How Stock Options Became Part of the Problem—
Once Seen as a Reform, They Grew into Font of Riches and System to be Gamed—Reload,
Reprice, Backdate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at A1; Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs
Peyer, Lucky CEOs 1 & n.1 (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 566, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=945392.
38. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, The Other Side of the Trade-Off: The
Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation, 107 J. POL. ECON. 65, 76–92, 103–04 (1999).
39. Canice Prendergast, The Tenuous Trade-Off Between Risk and Incentives, 110 J. POL.
ECON. 1071, 1077 tbl.1 (2002).
40. See infra pp. 1009–11.
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think. So just as the corporation’s internal control mechanisms
cannot squeeze all the agency costs out of the enterprise, neither can
the securities markets.
One might think that competition in the corporation’s product
markets would constrain managerial greed because that greed
increases the corporation’s costs. But the problem of agency costs is,
as I suggested at the outset, inherent in the structure of any large firm
or other large enterprise; it is therefore likely to plague all major
competitors in a market and thus not be eliminated by competition,
even if the markets in which the firms sell their products or services
are highly competitive. (An exception is markets in which there is
strong foreign competition, since foreign corporations pay their
CEOs less. It would be interesting to determine whether the
compensation of American CEOs is inverse to the market share of
foreign firms in the markets of the CEO’s firm.) Moreover, the effect
of excess CEO compensation on the firm’s welfare is indirect. The
direct effect is merely to transfer wealth from shareholders to
managers rather than to increase costs, although the indirect effect
(apart from any distortions of managerial behavior) is to increase the
firm’s cost of obtaining new equity capital.
Another imperfect, though not wholly negligible, control of
agency costs is public opinion. Companies cannot afford to ignore it
completely, because adverse public opinion can power legislative or
regulatory measures harmful to a company or an industry. There is no
42
doubt that CEOs want to avoid criticism in the media. A spate of
43
newspaper and magazine articles explains the ingenious devices by
which CEO compensation that would strike the average person as
grossly excessive is concealed from the public. Such articles, along
44
with well-publicized corporate scandals, can exert some downward
pressure on CEO compensation.
But this suggests that maybe what the designers of CEO
compensation packages are hiding from is not the shareholders but
41. See infra Part II.D.
42. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media
30–31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9309, 2002), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9309; see also, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay Becomes
Political, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3 (Business), at 1.
43. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71, 79–81.
44. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.

POSNER IN FINAL.DOC

3/16/2009 3:20:33 PM

1030

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1013

45

the general public. A related suggestion is that the gap between
European and American CEO compensation is due not to differences
in governance structures but to the fact that there is more envy in
European societies. Yet there is not zero envy in American society,
and envy has to influence corporate policy toward CEO
compensation—except to the extent that compensation can be
concealed from the public and the media.
C. Other Explanations for High CEO Compensation in the United
States
An alternative to the agency-costs theory of the high level of
compensation of American CEOs builds on the observation that the
46
average firm is larger in the United States than in Europe. The
larger the firm, the harder it is to manage, and so competition among
firms to hire the best managers will be more intense in the United
States and this (it is argued) will push up the average level of
American CEOs’ compensation. To correct for this size effect,
comparisons of American and European CEO compensation should
compare American and European firms of the same size. This is
47
rarely done, though a recent study comparing the incomes in 2004 of
the senior executives of 104 Japanese firms and 151 American firms,
all in the $1.87 billion to $2.85 billion asset range, found that the
Japanese executives earned on average only one fourth what their
48
U.S. counterparts did. Another study, comparing British and
American firms of similar size, found that American CEOs earned on
average 116 percent more than their British counterparts in 1997,
49
falling to 35 percent in 2003. But the authors assigned most of the
British-American difference to the greater variance in American
CEOs’ income, which arises because American CEOs receive a much
higher percentage of their income in the form of stock of their
50
company.
45. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the
Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 679 (2005).
46. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 1206.
47. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 17, at 24.
48. Nakazato et al., supra note 17, at 31.
49. Conyon et al., supra note 17, at 13.
50. Id. at 26. An earlier study had found a 190 percent pay gap in 1997. Martin J. Conyon &
Kevin J. Murphy, Feature, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United
Kingdom, ECON. J., Nov. 2000, at F640, F640.
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An argument related to relative size is based on the observation
that the increase in American CEOs’ compensation in recent decades
(a sixfold increase, inflation adjusted, since 1980, but before the
current financial crisis) is the same as the increase in the market value
51
of their firms. The argument is that the chief executive of a more
valuable firm is more productive than the chief executive of a small
firm, since, if he increases the firm’s value by a given percentage, the
absolute increase in the firm’s value will be greater. If there are two
equally skilled managers and one manages a grocery store and the
other IBM, the latter is creating greater value.
This assumes that firm value and executive skills are
complements. The real complementarity may be between firm size
and executive skills rather than between firm value and executive
skills. The relevant difference between IBM and a grocery store may
be relative size.
And both the size and the value theories ignore nonpecuniary
compensation. The larger and more valuable the firm, the more
prominent, prestigious, and (in the case of size) the more powerful
the CEO is. Prominence, prestige, and power are sources of
enormous pleasure to the people who claw their way to the top of
large organizations and in a competitive market should limit their
pecuniary income, in much the same way that long vacations limit
teachers’ salaries.
Notice that both the size and the value theories imply that the
supply of highly skilled managers is inelastic. Were it elastic, the
increased demand for managers would not result in higher pay, but
simply in an influx of qualified persons from other activities
(including the management of divisions of large firms). The
inelasticity of supply of highly skilled managers implies that the
higher pay of these managers is a scarcity rent, which could be taxed
away without reducing the supply significantly, though there would be
51. See Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? 1
(MIT Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 06-13, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
901826 (“[T]he six-fold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to
the six-fold increase in market capitalization of large US companies.”); see also Steven N.
Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest
Incomes? 41 (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 615, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=931280 (“[T]he total amount of capital per employee at the top 50 firms
in the securities industry . . . increased by almost nine times in real terms from 1987 to 2004.”).
The idea is not entirely new. See R. Glenn Hubbard, Pay Without Performance: A Market
Equilibrium Critique, 30 J. CORP. L. 717, 718–19 (2005).
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some reduction because the elasticity of supply is not zero. But
compensation that is “generous” merely because it contains scarcity
rents is not overcompensation as I have defined the term.
The correlation between firm size and CEO compensation could
be due not to a scarcity of skilled managers of large enterprises (in
fact, the upper ranks of large companies usually contain a number of
highly skilled and experienced managers eager for a shot at a CEO’s
job and able to perform it creditably) but simply to the fact that the
larger the firm’s market value, the easier it is to hide the
compensation of the top executives. If a 10 percent increase in the
firm’s value is associated with a 3 percent increase in its CEO’s
52
compensation, then the percentage of the firm’s value that is going
to him will have fallen, and the increase in his compensation is
unlikely to be criticized. This may be a major reason why so many
53
mergers have been found not to increase earnings per share. The
aggregate value of an enterprise will be greater as a result of a
merger; that will enable future increases in the CEO’s compensation
to be hidden more easily; and so the CEO will have an incentive to
make the merger even if it will not increase shareholder value. In
addition, he can trade on the common and correct belief that greater
skill is required to manage a larger than a smaller enterprise.
A related “hiding” point is that as long as CEO compensation
does not increase relative to the corporation’s income, shareholders
are unlikely to object even though the increase in the corporation’s
income is unlikely to result from its CEO’s having become better (or
from the corporation’s having acquired a new CEO at a premium
54
wage). As shown in the following graph, CEOs’ total compensation
(the top line in the graph) is closely related to (though, until very
recently, rising faster than) the income of the firms in the sample,
52. “An old rule of thumb holds that for every 10% increase in a company’s size, the
CEO’s pay goes up 3%.” David Wessel, With CEO Pay, Size Does Matter, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2,
2006, at A2.
53. See, e.g., Jarrad Harford & Kai Li, Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance:
The Case of Acquiring CEOs, 62 J. FIN. 917, 917 (2007) (“[E]ven in mergers where bidding
shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time.”); U.E.
Reinhardt, Conglomerate Earnings per Share: Immediate and Post-Merger Effects, 47 ACCT.
REV. 360, 363–64 (1972); David Harding & Phyllis Yale, Discipline and the Dilutive Deal,
HARV. BUS. REV., July 2002, at 18, 20; see also Gregor Andrade, Do Appearances Matter? The
Impact of EPS Accretion and Dilution on Stock Prices 1 (June 1999) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=172868.
54. The data in this graph are from Wharton Research Data Servs., supra note 18.
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even though it is unlikely that the increased profitability of a large
group of firms is due to increased quality of CEOs, especially if the
supply of CEOs competent to manage large firms is inelastic.

The graph helps to explain why concern with CEO compensation
is a relatively recent issue. The rise in firm income has not been
paralleled by a rise in personal incomes. With CEO compensation
rising in tandem with firm incomes (in fact even faster), the gap
between that compensation and the compensation of the average
55
worker has grown. This growth has incited a search for explanations,
and one candidate is overcompensation, specifically that rising firm
size and income provide better opportunities to hide CEO
compensation.
Furthermore, even if it were true that executive compensation
should as a matter of economic efficiency increase in proportion to
increase in firm size, this would not prove that the compensation of
executives of U.S. firms was appropriate, for if compensation was
excessive at the beginning of the period studied it would be so at the
end if it grew proportionately with the growth of the firm.
Still other students of the compensation issue argue that from the
shareholders’ standpoint, the critical “managerial” skill is not the
ability to manage a large enterprise efficiently but rather the perhaps
scarcer ability to use public relations skills and accounting

55. Carol Hymowitz, In the Lead: Pay Gap Fuels Worker Woes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2008,
at B8 (reporting that average CEO pay in 2007 was more than 180 times average worker pay—
twice the ratio in 1994).
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legerdemain to create a bubble in the corporation’s stock. The more
the corporation’s stock is worth, the lower the cost to the corporation
of acquiring additional capital, either by acquisition of other firms or
by issuing new shares, and also the lower the cost of attracting good
executives and other employees. If this analysis is correct, it is
efficient to base a CEO’s compensation on the performance of the
corporation’s stock rather than on the company’s fundamentals, such
as its profits, revenue, and costs. But it is efficient in a private rather
than in a social sense.
Another defense of excessive-seeming CEO compensation is that
such compensation is necessary to motivate CEOs to take large risks,
57
which is in the interest of the shareholders. Suppose that by virtue of
holding a diversified portfolio, an investor is risk neutral. A CEO, in
contrast, is likely to be risk averse because his human capital,
financial capital, and reputation capital are all likely to be highly
58
positively correlated with the performance of the firm. So if he takes
risks with the firm that increase the probability of bankruptcy, he will
not be consoled by the fact that his risk taking will also be increasing
the probability of extraordinary returns for the shareholders. The
risk-neutral investor may have to pay the CEO a large compensation
premium in order to induce him to take the level of risk with the
firm’s assets that the investor wants.
This argument is distinct from but complementary to the
argument I mentioned earlier that under conditions of uncertainty
performance-based compensation is superior to the payment of a
fixed amount because the principal cannot evaluate the quality of the
59
agent’s work directly but can only observe output. The arguments
coalesce in providing grounds for expecting CEO compensation to
have a large risk component, and therefore to be “generous” in order
to compensate the risk-averse CEO for taking risks.

56. Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?, AM. ECON. REV., May
2004, at 414, 415–16.
57. See Aggarwal & Samwick, supra note 38, at 65; Carol Callaway Dee, Ayalew Lulseged
& Tanya S. Nowlin, Executive Compensation and Risk: The Case of Internet Firms, 12 J. CORP.
FIN. 80, 94 (2005).
58. See, e.g., James A. Brickley, James S. Linck & Jeffrey L. Coles, What Happens to CEOs
After They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Incentives,
52 J. FIN. ECON. 341, 342 (1999).
59. See supra p. 1002.
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But the arguments are plausible mainly with respect to the subset
of firms that are owned by private-equity firms. If the private-equity
investors want the CEO of their firm to take risks, they can
compensate him, and—critically—because their ownership is
concentrated rather than dispersed, they can monitor his behavior to
assure that he takes risks. Dispersed ownership will find it difficult to
overcome the CEO’s reluctance to take risks that will increase the
likelihood of bankruptcy. A board of directors that is ineffectual in
squeezing the excess out of CEO compensation will be ineffectual in
designing a compensation package that will squeeze out that excess
automatically, as it were.
Thus the fact that the CEOs of private-equity firms are (it
appears—there are no systematic data) to be more generously
compensated than the CEOs of publicly held corporations does not
undermine the inference that the CEOs of publicly held corporations
are overcompensated. The competitive compensation for taking
really big risks of failure—career-ending risks, perhaps, because a
CEO who takes a big risk and loses may have great difficulty
rehabilitating his reputation in the business community—is high. But
a firm will not pay such compensation if it cannot ensure that the
CEO will actually take those risks; and a publicly held corporation,
operating through its board of directors, is unlikely to be able to
ensure that he will do that.
It could be argued, finally, that “hiding” CEO compensation is a
good thing because if the true level of compensation were publicized
it would actually drive up compensation. Some CEOs would learn
that they were being paid less than their peers, and they would push
for more. This is especially likely because people are highly sensitive
to their relative as well as their absolute wage. This in turn is partly
because of amour propre (people are naturally hierarchical—when
some years ago the Wall Street Journal published a list of the world’s
wealthiest people, only one person on that list was happy), and partly
because of the signaling effect—if X is paid less than Y at a
comparable company, the implication is that X is not as good as Y.
This theory of “hiding” complements the earlier suggestion that the
motive for hiding compensation may be to fend off the media and the
general public rather than the shareholders.
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D. Evidence of CEO Overcompensation Provided by BehavioralFinance Theory
The inference that CEO compensation is excessive is supported
by the challenge to efficient market theory mounted by the
behavioral-finance school. I have long defended a strong form of the
60
efficient market theory, and I continue to believe that it has
substantial explanatory value; it unquestionably has stimulated
important legal reforms, such as the reform of trust investment law to
allow trustees to adopt the buy and hold strategy, as distinct from
having to analyze the prospects of each stock or other asset in the
61
trust portfolio. But the implications of behavioral finance for efforts
to defend CEO compensation by reference to efficient market theory
62
are profound.
The efficient market theory assumes that securities markets
operate as if the traders in them were rational (which of course does
not mean omniscient—information is costly and “rational ignorance”
therefore not an oxymoron). The “as if–ness” of the assumption
needs to be emphasized. It could be that many traders are irrational
(“trading on noise” rather than trading on information), yet if their
deviations from rationality were random the average price of a
security would not be affected. Even if their deviations were
systematic, the effect on the average price would be slight if
arbitrageurs were alert for bargains. Arbitrageurs are speculators who
look for situations in which the identical thing or two very similar
goods (which could but need not be securities) are selling for
different prices. An arbitrageur might, for example, take advantage of
price discrimination by buying a product from those charged the
lower price because their demand is more elastic and reselling to
those charged a higher price because their demand is less elastic.
Suppose that because of an irrational fondness for stock X over
very similar stock Y, the price of X rises relative to that of Y even
60. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 451–52 (6th ed. 2003).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert
H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?,
50 J.L. & ECON 681 (2007).
62. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000). For an overview of behavioral finance theory, see generally
Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ASSET PRICING 1053, 1053–123
(George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2003).
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though the expected returns to the two stocks are the same. By selling
X short and buying Y, the arbitrageur makes a more or less
guaranteed profit. For if the two stocks are indeed close substitutes, a
continued rise in the price of X is likely to be accompanied by a rise
in the market value of Y, so that the arbitrageur will (though this will
depend on his borrowing costs) make up in profits on Y what he will
lose if, contrary to his expectation, the price of X does not fall. If it
does fall, his short selling will be profitable, and he is unlikely to incur
a commensurate loss on Y, since Y was undervalued relative to X
when it sold for less (since the stocks are so similar). The existence of
the close substitute is what enables the arbitrageur to minimize risk.
Without that substitute, his selling X short would be very risky
because he cannot be confident that it is overvalued; more precisely,
he cannot be confident that the market will “wake up” and realize
that it is overvalued.
But we must consider the bearing of the fact that “[i]nvestors
follow the advice of financial gurus, fail to diversify, actively trade
stocks and churn their portfolios, sell winning stocks and hold on to
losing stocks thereby increasing their tax liabilities, buy and sell
actively and expensively managed mutual funds, follow stock price
63
patterns and other popular models.” Although these pathologies
have long been known, the behavioral-finance literature finds that
they are systematic rather than random, that therefore they do not
cancel out, and thus that they influence aggregate stock market
behavior and investment performance. Investors are more reluctant
to sell losing than winning stocks (“loss aversion”). For the same
reason, they demand a higher premium for owning stocks relative to
bonds (because stocks have more downside risk than bonds and loss
aversion implies that downside risk weighs more heavily in the
investor’s decision than upside opportunity) than risk aversion would
warrant, given the possibility of reducing risk by means of
diversification. And because people have difficulty with probabilities
and tend therefore not to understand that runs are consistent with
chance, they see patterns where they do not exist and therefore give
greater weight to stocks’ short-run performance—and to the shortrun performance of money managers—than is warranted.
Professional money managers—or at least many of them (for
professionals are not immune from cognitive defects)—know better.
63. SHLEIFER, supra note 62, at 10.
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But if they are competing for the investment dollars of
unsophisticated investors, they must cater to those investors’
irrational predilections.
Arbitrage cannot be depended on to eliminate these
irrationalities because arbitrage works imperfectly when there are no
good substitute securities for the ones that the arbitrageur thinks are
overvalued or undervalued. And even if there are, the market may
not wake up in time for the effort at risk minimization to work. In my
example, if the price of X keeps rising after the arbitrageur has sold it
short and bought Y, but Y does not rise at the same time, he may
suffer staggering losses before the two stock prices finally converge.
Since arbitrage is an incomplete measure for limiting risk, investor
irrationalities can cause systematic deviations between stock price
and fundamental value. Irrational investor behavior is also promoted
by mutual funds, brokers, and other securities professionals who see
profit opportunities in exploiting that behavior.
The extent of these deviations from rationality is a matter of
controversy. And as is often the case with insights from cognitive
psychology, the policy implications are unclear. What is true is that
the more gullible investors are, the more important it is to have
effective remedies against securities fraud. Suppose that if a mutual
fund advertised that above-average performance for two years
running proves that its performance will be above average in the third
year, the law would not deny credulous investors a fraud remedy on
the ground that no one could be so dumb as to believe such a thing.
But to go much beyond this and, for example, forbid people to buy
stocks without first passing a test in clear thinking would hardly be
feasible.
Behavioral-finance theory strengthens the inference that CEO
compensation is excessive. It does this in two ways: by showing that
investors, even professional ones, may not evaluate compensation
issues with cool rationality, and by showing that stock-price
movements, upon which much of that compensation is based via the
grant of stock options, may not be reliable estimates of underlying
values, and hence of CEOs’ contribution to those values.
E. CEO Compensation and Corporate Fraud
The issue of overcompensation is at one end of a spectrum of
concern about the behavior of corporate executives. At the other end
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is criminal behavior by CEOs and other high-level corporate
executives. In recent years a number of corporate executives of major
corporations were prosecuted for corporate frauds that in some cases
(such as Enron and WorldCom) led to huge shareholder losses. The
well-publicized misconduct of these managers spurred enactment of
64
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which increased the penalties for
corporate fraud, stiffened auditing standards (and forbade companies
to purchase consulting services from their auditors), increased the
authority of independent directors, limited lending by corporations to
their executives, and in these and other ways sought to make
corporate managers more faithful agents of their (nominal)
principals, the shareholders.
Several of the recurrent types of misbehavior that have been
alleged relate directly to the issue of overcompensation of CEOs.
They are (besides the failure to expense stocks options and the
backdating of stock options, both discussed already)
1. failure to disclose in the company’s financial statements the
cost of nonpecuniary benefits to officers, including retired
officers, such as use of company aircraft and residences;
2. failure to disclose loans by corporations to their officers, or the
subsequent forgiveness of the loans;
3. inadequate supervision of management by boards of directors,
particularly the audit and compensation committees of the
board; and
4. Lavish issuance of stock options to corporate executives, a
practice claimed to have caused management to become
unduly preoccupied with, and desirous of manipulating, short65
term fluctuations in stock prices.
Other recurrent corporate abuses are indirectly related to
executive overcompensation:
1. Inflating the value of corporate assets (and creating the
appearance of less debt) by transferring some of them at
inflated prices to so-called “special purpose entities,” and

64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
65. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3.
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conflicts of interest when corporate executives are paid for
66
managing the controlled entities.
2. Accounting firms’ failure to audit their clients carefully,
perhaps owing to the conflict of interest inherent in the fact
the clients pay the auditor and to the further fact that they
may also be paying their auditor for consulting services, thus
increasing the auditor’s dependence on the company’s good
67
opinion.
The common element in the list is enrichment of corporate
officers by giving them corporate benefits concealed from or
inadequately disclosed to the corporation’s nominal owners, the
shareholders, or by concealing from the shareholders bad news that
would cause the corporation’s stock price to plummet and with it the
officers’ compensation. The charge, in short, is corporate looting by
insiders.
Corporate misconduct is not new, but does seem to have
68
increased since the mid-1990s, a period characterized by a dramatic
stock market boom followed by an equally dramatic bust. When the
price of a corporation’s stock is rising rapidly, shareholders’ and
directors’ concern with diversion of profits to officers is attenuated.
The diversion is likely to seem inconsequential (even if rising in
absolute terms, it may be falling in percentage terms if the stock
market is rising), and the officers can claim with greater or less
plausibility that the rise is due, in part anyway, to their efforts, and so
a greater reward to them is justified on incentive grounds. When the
bust occurs, the officers have an incentive to employ tactics that will
postpone the collapse in the value of their company’s stock and thus
buffer the impact of the bust on their personal wealth.
F. CEO Compensation and the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis that hit the nation and the world in
September 2008 and appears at this writing to have precipitated the
first major U.S. depression since the Great Depression of the 1930s

66. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–6 (2002).
67. Id. at 13–14.
68. Kathleen A. Lacey, Barbara Crutchfield George & Clyde Stoltenberg, Assessing the
Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Certification Provisions: A Comparative Analysis
Using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 404–14 (2005).
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cannot be attributed directly to executive overcompensation, but
there is an indirect relation. With compensation tied by stock options
to share value, with senior executives’ risk aversion offset by
generous severance packages and repricing of options, and with share
values a positive function to a significant degree of the riskiness with
which the firm invests its assets, CEOs have an incentive to increase
leverage (borrowed relative to equity capital). Since the cost of debt
to a firm is fixed (that is, the firm must repay the debt with interest
regardless of the firm’s revenues), but its revenues vary with price and
output, the smaller the firm’s equity cushion relative to its total assets,
the greater the risk of failure. The financial crisis was precipitated by
the fact that the risks taken by financial firms were highly correlated
and closely tied to housing prices (many of the assets held by banks
and other financial institutions were in the form of securities backed
by mortgages), so that when the housing bubble burst, much of the
69
world’s financial industry was at or over the brink of insolvency.
A particularly insidious effect of executive overcompensation in
relation to the financial crisis, besides the effects just discussed, is the
incentive it imparts to CEOs to ride a bubble until it bursts. During
the housing bubble, housing prices and therefore mortgage demand
were rising but interest rates were very low, so that the greater a
lender’s leverage the greater its profits. Management that felt it was
in a bubble situation could always reduce its borrowing and therefore
its lending, but in the short run—which is to say until the bubble
burst—it would be sacrificing substantial profits. The greater a CEO’s
compensation is, and the closer it is tied to the price of his
corporation’s stock, the greater his incentive to maximize short-run
profits. The compensation he can earn in the short run provides a
form of insurance against the consequences of mistiming the bubble
and failing to jump off it before it bursts, as does a generous
severance package.
III. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF OVERCOMPENSATING CEOS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT THOSE COSTS
Theory and evidence suggest that there is indeed
overcompensation of the CEOs of American publicly held
69. See Nicholas Varchaver & Katie Benner, The $55 Trillion Question, FORTUNE, Oct. 13,
2008, at 134, 134; Wall Street’s Bad Dream: The Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2008, at
85, 85.
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70

corporations. We must consider to what extent it imposes significant
social costs or merely redistributes wealth from the shareholders to
CEOs and other senior corporate executives, and in light of those
costs and that redistribution what if anything should be done to
reduce overcompensation.
The redistributive effects are obvious and are troubling from an
ethical standpoint because, by definition, overcompensation is a kind
of theft from shareholders. But there are social costs as well—that is,
not only is the economic pie resliced in favor of CEOs and other
senior management, but in the process the pie becomes smaller.
The most dramatic cost is the one just discussed: the contribution
that CEO overcompensation appears to have made to the financial
crash—probably a small contribution, but to an economic
catastrophe. Even in normal times, there are social costs to
71
overcompensation. Corporate executives can and often do expend
resources—the equivalent of the cost of burglar tools—to increase
their compensation in ways other than by working harder and
smarter. And potential victims have an incentive to incur costs to
prevent themselves from becoming victims; so investors may be
deflected from corporate stock to types of investment that yield a
lower social return. These are social costs of CEO overcompensation
too.
In addition, overcompensation implies a misallocation of
executive talent. Talented executives are drawn to enterprises that for
whatever reason overpay their CEOs, relative to other enterprises,
including nonprofit and governmental entities, where the ability to
hide excessive compensation is more limited (no stock options, for
example). And overcompensation creates, as we know, hiding
incentives that may distort managerial behavior, for example by
inducing inefficient corporate acquisitions because by increasing the

70. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF THE
AMERICAN EXECUTIVE passim (1991); see also C. Terry Grant & Gerry H. Grant, Can
Regulations Curb Excessive Executive Pay?, STRATEGIC FIN., Sept. 2008, at 31, 36 (noting that
the increase in the total median executive compensation between 1992 and 2006 outpaced the
rate of growth in the net income and operating cash flows of the corresponding companies).
71. See Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in
Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 145 (1995); John C. Gamboa &
Mary Ann Mitchell, Editorial, The Fed Is Overlooking the Inflationary Effect of CEO
Compensation, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 2000, at A27.
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firm’s income they make it easier to conceal the water in the CEO’s
72
compensation. Some means of concealment are fraudulent.
The redistributive effects and social costs cannot be quantified
(nor is there a common metric by which to aggregate the two types of
effect), but appear to be sufficiently large, especially in light of the
recent financial crisis, to warrant serious consideration of possible
ameliorative measures. Care is necessary, because efforts to reform
corporate governance can easily backfire, even the kind of reform
73
decreed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to prevent outright fraud. For
example, the inflation of corporate assets by transferring them at
inflated prices to special purpose entities (one of Enron’s principal
abuses) is a form of fraud when the inflation is concealed from
investors in the transferor corporation. But fraud has long been
criminal, and the successful prosecution of the Enron executives
suggests that adequate legal tools were in place to deal with such
conduct before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed. It would be a
mistake, moreover, to forbid all transfers of assets to special-purpose
entities; such transfers confer genuine economic benefits, namely the
74
disintermediation of debt (that is, the better matching debt to the
risk preferences of particular investors). And quite apart from the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act it would be possible, invoking what in tax law is
75
called the “substance over form” doctrine, to forbid such transfers
when they have no economic purpose but are designed merely to shift
corporate debt from one pocket to another in the hope that investors
will have difficulty finding the second pocket. Similarly, although
there is evidence that the Act has reduced the practice of backdating
76
stock options, it has not eliminated it, and fraud investigations by the

72. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 43, at 88–89; see also Nakazato et al., supra note
17, at 9.
73. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 26–35; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–43 (2005). For strong
empirical support, see Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies
Cross-Listed in the US, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195, 218–27 (2007).
74. Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2002).
75. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935); Yosha v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1988).
76. Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 12–13; Daniel W. Collins, Guojin Gong & Haidan Li,
The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Timing Manipulation of CEO Stock Option
Awards 20–23 (Nov. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
850564.
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Department of Justice are likely to prove a superior deterrent.
Likewise the investment banks’ practice of allocating IPO shares to
individuals who can steer lucrative underwriting work to the bank is a
form of commercial bribery and hence fraud, and the scandals may
bring it to a halt without need for legal action.
As for the receipt by accounting firms of fees for consulting
services, as well as for auditing, requiring the corporation to disclose
to investors the terms of its relations with its auditors, thus leaving the
investors to penalize corporation by bidding down its stock price if
they think the auditor has been “bought,” is as far as the law should
go. Not that this is a complete solution to the problem, for we know
that behavioral-finance theory has raised serious doubts about the
efficiency of the stock market’s response to such information. But the
quest for perfection is elusive. It is hard to see who other than the
audited firms would pay the auditor or how clients could be
prevented from recycling the fees they now “overpay” auditors (the
overpayment being the inducement for the auditor to report a
favorable audit) for consulting services as higher fees for auditing.
The fundamental conflict of interest would remain.
Stock options should not be forbidden, as they do have some
77
tendency to align managerial compensation with firm performance.
Their efficacy and appropriateness, as well as their magnitude and
their net impact on the value of the firm, are receiving greater market
scrutiny, as they should, for as I said earlier they are a clumsy
instrument for incentivizing managers. In principle, it would be
preferable to base stock options on the performance of a company’s
stock relative not to some base period but to the stock of the other
companies in the same industry. The problem is that picking the
comparison group (all companies? all companies of the same size? all
companies of the same profitability, capital structures, markets?)
involves considerable uncertainty. It is hardly a task to entrust with
confidence to the Securities and Exchange Commission or some other
regulatory agency. If aware of its limitations the agency decided to
regulate with a light hand, it would be acting prudently but it would
also be enabling firms to sneak overcompensation in by the back
78
door, by adroit choice of the comparison group.
77. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 653, 684–85 (1998).
78. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 28.
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It is hard to believe that much turns on whether stock options are
treated, as they should be, as a corporate expense. The information
concerning the number of stock options granted and to whom and at
what strike price is public, albeit in the footnotes of the corporation’s
79
financial statements; now, at least, analysts are sensitive to the issue.
Placing a ceiling on CEO salaries and other compensation would
be a mistake. Apart from the infeasibility of a government agency’s
determining the amount of water in an executive’s pay, capping
salaries by government fiat, like other regulatory price controls,
would incite wasteful activities that would be more costly to society
than overcompensation is. In the first instance overcompensation is a
wealth transfer from shareholders to executives rather than a social
cost. The social cost consists of the devotion of resources to hiding
and the deflection of investment away from publicly owned
corporations. A cap on compensation might reduce the size of the
wealth transfer, and the social costs arising from the transfer, slightly;
but the benefits would almost certainly be outweighed by the social
costs that the cap would generate. These would include more hiding,
some of it by socially very costly devices such as inefficient mergers,
and the substitution for pecuniary compensation of nonpecuniary
forms of compensation that involve significant social costs, such as
empire building (another spur to inefficient mergers), private planes
and limousines, and lavish offices.
Four reform measures, however, seem to me to deserve serious
consideration. The first and most obvious is requiring publicly held
corporations to disclose the full compensation of all senior executives,
including pension entitlements discounted to present value, health
benefits, severance pay, private use of corporate facilities including
planes and apartments, club memberships paid for by the
corporation, and all other perquisites, monetized where possible and
subject to public audit.
The second measure that merits serious consideration is to
require that a substantial share of executive compensation be
backloaded and tied to the future performance of the firm. For
example, a corporation might be forbidden to provide severance pay
to its CEO (though it could pay him a signing bonus) and required to
pay him a specified percentage of his compensation in the form of
79. See Kara Scannell & Joann S. Lublin, SEC Issues Rules on Executive Pay, Options
Grants, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2006, at C1.
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restricted stock in the corporation—stock that he could not sell for a
specified number of years. Such a reform would combat the
dangerous incentive of highly compensated CEOs to maximize shortterm corporate profits and take undue risks with the corporation’s
assets.
Third, consideration should be given to steeply increasing the
marginal income tax rate of persons who have very high incomes.
Such incomes typically contain a good deal of economic rent (that is,
income above what the person could obtain in his next best
employment), and taxing economic rents is, in principle anyway (I
will explain this qualification shortly), highly efficient because it has
80
minimal substitution effects.
And fourth, proxy fights should perhaps be easier to wage. With
competing slates of directors, directors might, as in democratic
political competition, become more faithful agents of the
81
shareholders, their electorate.
I said that these measures deserve serious consideration, not that
they should be adopted forthwith. They have drawbacks. For
example, in practice progressive taxation abounds with loopholes and
distorts the allocation of resources, and, unless it took the form of an
“excess profits” tax, which would be wholly unmanageable, it would
hit incomes that contained substantial economic rents, and incomes
that did not, indiscriminately.
And forcing greater transparency on corporations by requiring
that they disclose publicly the full value of their senior executives’
compensation might turn out to be a case of closing the barn door
after the horses have escaped. For in the wake of the financial crisis,
the issue of CEO compensation has become so controversial that
82
efforts to conceal compensation are likely to fail. So perhaps
attainment of transparency can thus be left to the market, aided by
83
increasingly aggressive media.

80. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, ECONOMICS 350 (2d ed. 1998).
81. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 672–73 (2005).
82. Steve Lohr, In Bailout Furor, Wall St. Pay Becomes Target for Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2008, at A1.
83. See, e.g., Erin White & Aaron O. Patrick, Shareholders Push for Vote on Executive Pay,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at B1.
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The measures I have suggested for consideration should not,
however, be brushed aside on the ground that the costs may exceed
the benefits when all direct and indirect consequences are considered.
In the wake of the financial crisis there is almost certainly going to be
some regulation of executive compensation—it has begun in the form
of conditions in the recent bailouts of insolvent financial firms. The
question is not whether, but how best, to limit executive
compensation.

